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One key theme in sociological analysis of neuro-enhancement has been the question 
of whether the drive for enhancement promotes the cultural value of individualism. It 
has been argued that neuro-enhancement discourses implicitly propagate new respon-
sibilities that oblige individuals to continually “work on” their brain to ensure its health 
and productivity. However, much of this critique relies on rather abstract analyses of 
discursive trends, with relatively little consideration of empirical evidence illuminating 
the role played by more “micro” social dynamics, such as interpersonal relationships, 
in the logics and practices of neuro-enhancement. This article proposes a novel per-
spective on neuro-enhancement by reviewing existing empirical literature enlightening 
everyday engagements with neuro-enhancement, and suggesting that relationality, 
rather than pure individualism, may be a better framework for conceptualizing these 
findings. The article advances this argument through a particular focus on two major 
preoccupations of neuro-enhancement discourses, namely, enhancing children’s brains 
and preventing age-related cognitive deterioration. The article synthesizes the empirical 
evidence showing that these two concerns are essentially relational in experience and 
considers how familial relationships and conceptualizations of caregiving shape the ways 
neuro-enhancement concepts and technologies unfold in everyday life. The article offers 
insights from the philosophical literature on relationality as a conceptual framework to 
steer further investigation of neuro-enhancement’s impact on contemporary society. 
A more holistic understanding of the relational dynamics that characterize everyday 
engagement with neuro-enhancement practices will enable better anticipation of the 
risks and benefits such practices may entail, due to greater insight into how they are 
likely to be enacted in context.
Keywords: neuro-enhancement, relationality, pediatric neuro-enhancement, aging, individualization, responsibility
inTrODUcTiOn
The meaning of neuro-enhancement, its prevalence and use, and its justification and critiques 
have evolved over recent decades. Typically, neuro-enhancement refers to the use of technologies 
such as prescription medication and brain stimulation for the purpose of augmenting normal 
cognitive or affective function (Parens, 1998; Farah, 2005; Nagel, 2010a, 2014; Lucke and Partridge, 
2013). In a wider sense, other interventions such as nutrition and cognitive training can also be 
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understood as neuro-enhancement (Dresler et al., 2013; George 
and Whitehouse, 2011; Lumma and Nagel, 2016). While many 
of the relevant techniques were originally developed for use in 
clinical populations, they are increasingly proposed as options 
for persons who are healthy and “normal” across the lifespan. 
Notably, neuro-enhancement is not only suggested to have the 
potential to influence cognitive facilities (e.g., memory and 
attention), but also physical capacities (e.g., muscle strength and 
sleep), affective states (e.g., moods and emotions) and even social 
and moral competencies (e.g., moral decision-making) (Nagel, 
2010a). There is mixed data on the veracity of these claimed 
effects (de Jongh et al., 2008; Repantis et al., 2009, 2010; Battleday 
and Brem, 2015). However, it is important to note that while the 
effectiveness and scientific validity of many neuro-enhancement 
applications remain uncertain, their popularity and cultural 
prominence mean that they merit ethical scrutiny irrespective 
of whether they actually are effective. This need not contribute 
to the “hype” (Hasler, 2012) that often surrounds discussion of 
neuroscientific advances, but instead can help avoid a “phantom 
debate” (Quednow, 2010) by grounding ethical analysis in rea-
soned, empirically informed discussion of actual social practice.
The notion that we can affect our neurocognitive performance 
through deliberate action has many appealing dimensions. 
It promises a greater degree of control over our futures, and a route 
to promoting health, happiness, autonomy, and economic success 
(Harris, 2007; Greely et al., 2008; Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009; 
Savulescu et al., 2011). However, the topic of neuro-enhancement 
also raises numerous ethical issues. Neuro-enhancement’s impli-
cations in relation to standard bioethical principles, such as users’ 
safety and autonomy, have received necessary consideration in 
the literature (Parens, 1998; Farah et  al., 2004; Nagel, 2010a). 
Yet, neuro-enhancement raises more complex ethical issues 
than direct threats to the safety and autonomy of the individuals 
who avail of enhancement technologies. Neuro-enhancement 
is extensively discussed in the media and increasingly absorbed 
into public policy (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015; O’Connor and 
Joffe, 2015). As a cultural phenomenon, neuro-enhancement has 
potential repercussions for broad societal issues such as justice, 
equality, markets, and health policies (Singh and Kelleher, 2010; 
Nagel, 2015; Ray, 2016). Thus, further ethical considerations 
relate to the type of society that neuro-enhancement reflects and 
reinforces. As a result, the popularity of new neuro-enhancement 
technologies has sparked extensive sociological scrutiny. One of 
the most frequent themes in this analysis has been the question 
of whether the drive for neurocognitive enhancement promotes 
the cultural value of individualism (Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Biebricher, 
2011; Ortega, 2011; Thornton, 2011; Joldersma, 2016). The cur-
rent paper seeks to advance understanding of these ideological 
dynamics by bringing into focus the micro-social dimension 
of how people engage with neuro-enhancement ideas in real-
world social contexts. It reviews empirical research enlightening 
everyday engagements with neuro-enhancement and argues that 
relationality, rather than pure individualism, may be a better 
framework for conceptualizing these findings. It offers insights 
from the philosophical literature on relationality as a conceptual 
framework to steer further investigation of neuro-enhancement’s 
impact on contemporary society.
A concern with investigating how neuro-enhancement 
resonates in ordinary social life requires consideration of how 
“neuro-enhancement” is to be defined. The extant empirical and 
conceptual literature on the topic has primarily concentrated 
its discussion on technological means of enhancement, with a 
particular focus on psychotropic medication. Such practices are 
indeed increasingly salient in society at large (Farah, 2015). Yet, 
sociological research shows that concern with enhancing brains 
manifests at a much broader level of practice, such as the adoption 
of daily nutritional and cognitive training regimes specifically 
oriented toward improving neurocognitive function (Pitts-
Taylor, 2010; Thornton, 2011; O’Connor and Joffe, 2015). Again, 
whether these actually do affect neurocognitive performance is 
uncertain, yet inconsequential for studying neuro-enhancement 
as a cultural phenomenon: when the aim is to understand how 
neuro-enhancement is being configured as a cultural ideal, the 
key condition for analytic attention is that a particular practice 
is experienced as an act of enhancement. In the current paper, 
we adopt an inclusive definition of neuro-enhancement, which 
incorporates any behavior that the actor undertakes with the 
specific aim of enhancing neurocognitive function. While this is 
somewhat imprecise, inclusivity is an advantage in an explora-
tory analysis, as it reduces the chances that some important 
phenomenon will be overlooked. This is especially pertinent 
since technological means of neuro-enhancement remain in 
use by only a minority of the population, who have often been 
prompted to adopt these technologies by a specific neurological 
or psychological diagnosis. If logics of neuro-enhancement also 
manifest in more prosaic everyday behaviors, such as nutrition 
and leisure regimes, this may be where their impact is most 
pervasive (Lumma and Nagel, 2016). While such practices are 
not intrinsically or necessarily enhancements, they can be expe-
rienced as such if they are performed with the aim of affording 
the user a competitive advantage in the culture in which they 
are operating. Adopting a broad definition of what “counts” as 
neuro-enhancement thus affords the best chance of capturing 
the multifarious ways people are engaging with this ideal in their 
day-to-day lives.
Considering neuro-enhancement in its social context 
makes clear that the extent and nature of engagement with 
neuro-enhancement deviates across important social categories 
such as culture, gender, and class. The current paper  seeks to 
enlighten the  micro-social dynamics of neuro-enhancement 
through a particular focus on the generational dimension of 
neuro-enhancement experiences. The ethical questions neuro-
enhancement raises may vary according to the developmental 
stage of the population at which it is targeted (Forlini and 
Racine, 2011). This is reflected, for instance, in the American 
Academy of Neurology’s differing guidelines for use of neuro-
enhancement for children and adults, which recommend more 
conservative practice for children (Graf et  al., 2013) than for 
adults (Larriviere et al., 2009). Children are frequently positioned 
as vulnerable consumers (Graf et al., 2013). While enhancement 
in adolescents is often justified with reference to the principle of 
personal autonomy, enhancement for young children is more 
difficult to evaluate because their underdeveloped cognitive and 
legal competence establishes a special vulnerability to any risks 
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neuro-enhancement technologies might incur (Graf et al., 2013). 
Just as children need distinct consideration, the group of the 
elderly is often also positioned as requiring caution in relation to 
enhancement endeavors. Given that enhancement is usually most 
relevant to elderly people experiencing or anticipating cognitive 
decline, questions about personal autonomy and risk again arise 
when neuro-enhancement is targeted at this population.
In an exploration of the micro-social dynamics of neuro-
enhancement, focusing on children and the elderly adds particu-
lar analytic value due to the unique social positioning of these 
populations. Members of both groups have a heightened level of 
dependence on others, generally within a family context. As such, 
data enlightening engagement with neuro-enhancement within 
these populations should offer a particularly direct glimpse of 
how neuro-enhancement is mediated by personal relationships. 
The current paper reviews the existing empirical research that 
illuminates how the ideas and practices of neuro-enhancement 
manifest in the lives of children and elderly people and considers 
how these findings resonate with philosophical reasoning on 
individualism and relationality. With this structure, the paper 
does not claim to capture the full spectrum of relationships that 
may mediate neuro-enhancement’s social effects. Firstly, it con-
centrates mostly on familial relationships: relationships rooted in 
non-domestic contexts, such as educational and medical settings, 
are undoubtedly also important. Furthermore, in focusing on 
children and older people, the paper omits direct consideration of 
the young and middle-aged adults who, in many cases, are those 
providing the care that children and older individuals require. 
While these groups doubtlessly also merit attention, they lie out-
side the scope of the current paper. Here, childhood and aging are 
adopted as case studies on which to base a preliminary conceptual 
investigation of the micro-social context of neuro-enhancement 
ideas and practices.
neUrO-enhanceMenT anD 
inDiViDUaliZaTiOn
Individualism is an ethos deeply rooted in Western civilization. 
Many cultural theorists have observed that processes of indi-
vidualization gathered pace in European and American societies 
throughout the twentieth century (Lukes, 1973; Sampson, 1988). 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) define individualization as the 
instantiation of:
a compulsion, albeit a paradoxical one, to create, to 
stage manage, not only one’s own biography but the 
bonds and networks surrounding it and to do this 
amid changing preferences and at successive stages of 
life, while constantly adapting to the conditions of the 
labour market, the education system, the welfare state 
and so on (p. 30).
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002) formulation of individualization is characterized by two 
primary features: the individualization of social risks such as 
unemployment and environmental degradation, so that social 
problems are perceived and explained in terms of individuals’ 
flawed behavior, and the rising importance of individual achieve-
ment orientation. Whereas in previous epochs, a person’s identity 
was largely “given” by their social positioning, under conditions 
of individualization fashioning an identity becomes a task with 
which individuals are charged. Individualization is thus centrally 
linked with responsibilization: individuals bear practical respon-
sibility for forging their destinies, and moral responsibility for the 
successes or failures of those efforts.
On the surface, this historically new level of agency is empow-
ering. Presumably, encouraging people to make choices in line 
with their personal preferences should maximize the number 
of people who achieve “the good life.” However, Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2002) argue that opportunities for action can quickly 
become burdens of action. Nagel (2010) draws on evidence from 
psychology and economics to refute the simplistic assumption 
that more choice necessarily leads to more well-being: empirical 
evidence shows that an abundance of choice is often experienced 
in terms of anxiety, frustration, and anticipated and/or actual 
regret. One of the primary reasons for this is that “whatever turns 
out to be a matter of choice and personal control also turns into a 
candidate for blame and self-blame” (Nagel, 2010, p. 114). This is 
clearly illustrated in the domain of health, which in recent decades 
has been increasingly constructed as an outcome of one’s lifestyle 
choices (Rabinow, 1992; Crawford, 2006). While this framing can 
motivate people to make health-promoting decisions, it can also 
produce a tendency toward victim blaming when health calami-
ties do befall an individual (Wikler, 1987; Link and Phelan, 1995; 
Lantz and Booth, 1998; Quinn and Crocker, 1999; Crawford, 
2006; Kim and Willis, 2007). The emphasis on individual agency 
means that the causal influence of uncontrollable biological 
forces, as well as social factors such as gender, class, and race, 
are systematically underappreciated in explaining individuals’ life 
outcomes.
An enduring critique of contemporary neuroscience has been 
that by focusing its gaze inside the human skull, neuroscience 
perpetuates individualistic modes of explanation (Maasen and 
Sutter, 2007; Gergen, 2010; Meloni, 2011; Canter, 2012; Joldersma, 
2016). Critical theorists’ attention has been particularly drawn 
to the field of neuro-enhancement, due to the parallels between 
the concept of neuro-plasticity and the neoliberal values of flex-
ibility, mobility, and adaptability (Malabou, 2008; Choudhury 
et  al., 2009; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Ortega, 2011; Papadopoulos, 
2011). The concept of neuro-enhancement implies that aspects 
of human life previously beyond our control—the biological 
foundations of cognitive development and decline—are now mal-
leable by deliberate human action. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s 
(Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002) theory predicts that in an 
individualized society, a situation where individuals can enhance 
their brain will fast become a situation where individuals should 
enhance their brain. From this perspective, opportunities for 
neuro-enhancement mutate into a new form of responsibiliza-
tion, whereby individuals are obliged to continually “work on” 
their brain to ensure its health and productivity (Pitts-Taylor, 
2010; Biebricher, 2011). Those who fall short of socioeconomic 
demands for lifelong productivity and self-reliance can be blamed 
for failing to perform the required neurological self-government. 
4O’Connor and Nagel Neuro-Enhancement, Relationality, and Individualism
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 2 | Article 1
As Pitts-Taylor (2010) puts it, “Seeing ourselves in neuronal terms 
may be becoming a duty of biomedical citizenship, since failure to 
think about our brains in neuroscientific terms, or at all, not only 
invites risk but may increasingly constitute moral failure” (p. 649). 
Neuro-enhancement is thus seen as reflecting and reinforcing an 
increasingly individualistic, competitive culture.
However, understanding of the sociopolitical implications 
of neuro-enhancement is limited by the fact that much of the 
existing literature on the topic is speculative in nature. When 
empirical evidence is included, it is usually restricted to the 
analysis of media texts or commercial products. While these data 
contain valuable indicators of how neuro-enhancement is being 
configured in wider culture, they cannot give direct insight into 
its manifestation in lived experience. To fully understand the 
normative implications of new opportunities for neuro-enhance-
ment, we need first to answer the empirical question of how 
humans do in fact respond to the increased degree of choice and 
responsibility these technologies entail (Bostrom and Sandberg, 
2009; Forlini and Hall, 2016). The research that has investigated 
how neuro-enhancement ideas are received by the lay public has 
revealed some unexpected findings: for instance, although people 
are interested in neuro-enhancement and conscious of normative 
pressures to engage in it (Cabrera et al., 2014; Fitz et al., 2014; 
Schelle et al., 2014), actual uptake of neuro-enhancement regimes 
may be relatively low (Pickersgill et al., 2014; O’Connor and Joffe, 
2015). A valid and responsible analysis of neuro-enhancement’s 
cultural implications should be sensitive to its real-life operations, 
and incorporate the nuances and qualifications that are evident 
therein.
An inevitable consequence of focusing on real-world human 
activity is an acknowledgment of the undeniably interdependent 
state of human existence. An extreme version of the individualist 
critique of neuroscience suggests that neuroscience promotes a 
philosophy akin to Sampson’s (Sampson, 1977) “self-contained 
individualism.” Under this conceptualization, human life is deso-
cialized to such an extent that the resulting society is comprised 
of entirely atomized, alienated individuals. Theoretically, neuro-
enhancement could contribute to an “each man/woman for him/
herself ” mentality by encouraging individuals to constantly seek 
neurocognitive advantage over others. However, a cursory glance 
at how neuro-enhancement is enacted in contemporary society 
shows that pure self-interest cannot be the sole driving force. 
Almost all analyses of media accounts of neuro-enhancement 
have highlighted a major focus on enhancing children’s brains 
(Thornton, 2008, 2011; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; O’Connor and Joffe, 
2013a). The marketing of neuro-enhancement is often directed at 
parents who are presumably motivated by promoting their chil-
dren’s interests, rather than their own. As we demonstrate below, 
another major preoccupation of neuro-enhancement discourses, 
preventing dementia in later life, is underpinned by concerns 
about the impact dementia would have on one’s loved ones, rather 
than only the directly affected person him/herself. Thus, inter-
personal relationships lie at the core of how neuro-enhancement 
concepts and technologies play out in everyday life. Imperatives for 
neuro-enhancement are configured in terms of responsibilities to 
others, as well as responsibilities to oneself (Broer and Pickersgill, 
2015). Given these diverse felt responsibilities toward others, 
neuro-enhancement discourse and practice must be understood 
in terms of individuals’ connectedness to other people. As we will 
argue below, it even specifically targets these relationships as the 
medium through which neuro-enhancement is to be enacted.
Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) cohere with this framing in their 
assertion that brains are not understood as totally individualized 
and isolated; they suggest that quite on the contrary, the brain 
can be conceived as a new locus of sociality. Scrutinizing the 
discourse around neuro-enhancement shows that optimizing 
brains is recommended not just for the benefit of individuals, but 
for the wider social good (Thornton, 2011; Rose and Abi-Rached, 
2013; Broer and Pickersgill, 2015). Adults are exhorted to sculpt 
their children’s brains and prevent their own neurocognitive 
deterioration, in order to cultivate a productive, entrepreneurial 
society composed of self-sufficient actors who do not burden 
social resources. Neuro-enhancement has also been proposed 
as a tool for improving public health (Shaw, 2014) and reduc-
ing social inequalities (Ray, 2016). The political implications of 
neuroscience’s use in social policy have already been the subject 
of much analysis (Wastell and White, 2012; Macvarish et al., 2014; 
Munro and Musholt, 2014; Broer and Pickersgill, 2015; Edwards 
et al., 2015). Less attention, however, has been paid to the role 
played by more “micro” social dynamics, i.e., interpersonal rela-
tionships, in the logics and practices of neuro-enhancement. The 
current paper seeks to fill this gap by considering what is known 
about the familial contexts in which neuro-enhancement ideas 
manifest across the lifecourse, with particular attention to the 
ways applications are targeted at young children and aging adults.
neUrO-enhanceMenT in chilDhOOD
One of the most common themes in public discussion of neuro-
enhancement is the recommendation of intervention in the first 
years of life, which are positioned as a critical neurodevelopmental 
period (O’Connor and Joffe, 2013a). Appropriate stimulation in 
the brain’s early development, it is argued, will lay the foundations 
for healthy cognitive, social, and emotional outcomes (Allen, 
2011). Alternatively, failure to take advantage of this time-limited 
critical period will result in lifelong neurocognitive disadvantage. 
Neuroscientific concepts have been appropriated by many toy 
manufacturers, food producers, pharmaceutical companies, 
and book publishers to propose a wide range of interventions 
that purportedly optimize brain development during early life 
(Thornton, 2011).  These recommendations for pediatric neuro-
enhancement have been challenged for various scientific and 
ethical reasons (Singh and Kelleher, 2010; Graf et al., 2013).
Inevitably, commercializations of neuro-enhancement are 
marketed at parents, who are exhorted to implement the enhance-
ment techniques on their child’s behalf. The ways pediatric neuro-
enhancement is promoted are therefore closely bound up with 
prevailing cultural constructions of the parent–child relationship. 
The discourse that surrounds neuro-enhancement is premised on 
deeply engrained beliefs about parenting, and more particularly 
mothering (Gillies et  al., 2016). In particular, pediatric neuro-
enhancement dovetails with an ethic of “intensive parenting” 
(Hays, 1996) that encourages parents to invest maximal time, 
energy, and resources in the “concerted cultivation” (Lareau, 
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2002) of their child’s abilities. Nadesan (2002) argues that family 
life in the twentieth century was marked by the emergence of a 
desire among parents for their children to exceed the norm in 
developmental achievements. This competitive mindset became 
particularly fixated on the domain of intelligence (Nadesan, 
2002). Neuro-enhancement clearly chimes with this parental 
preoccupation. Indeed, it could be argued that the logic of 
neuro-enhancement in childhood only makes sense within the 
context of a widespread desire to help one’s child attain a level 
of intellectual achievement that excels beyond that of their peers 
(Wall, 2010).
Thornton (2011) suggests that more recent years have seen a 
shift in focus away from cognitive achievement toward a super-
ficially more rounded priority of emotional well-being. This 
construction of emotional well-being is also mediated through 
the brain, drawing heavily on ideas from attachment theory and 
affective neuroscience. Here, the means of neuro-enhancement 
is day-to-day maternal interaction rather than technological 
intervention. However, this does not render the enhancement 
agenda any less burdensome for the caregiver. Although suffused 
with a “back to basics” ethos that emphasizes “natural” maternal 
“instinct,” this new discursive turn is argued to place subtle but 
heavy pressures on mothers to monitor and regulate their own 
affective experience (Thornton, 2011). Mothers are advised to 
classify and count their facial expressions, vocal utterances, and 
internal feelings to ensure that the infant’s “emotional brain” is 
receiving optimal input. Neuro-enhancement thus feeds into 
a cultural encouragement of emotionally intensive forms of 
caregiving.
The small body of research that has directly asked parents about 
their experiences of these discourses suggests they can impose a 
heavy burden. Wall’s (Wall, 2010) interviews with middle-class 
Canadian mothers showed that despite some skepticism about 
the “now or never” logic of the early years discourse, mothers 
showed full certainty about their ability to affect their child’s life 
outcomes via their brains, and a sense of responsibility to do so 
in the optimally effectual manner. As one mother put it, “I am 
constantly aware that everything I do affects how their brains are 
going to develop” (Wall, 2010, p. 257). This pervasive sense of 
responsibility was matched by guilt regarding inevitable failures 
to meet the demanding standards of constant intensive, stimulat-
ing one-on-one interaction with one’s child. Similar research in a 
British context suggests that some mothers experience the provi-
sion of intensive cognitive stimulation as a mandatory part of the 
maternal identity (Budds et al., 2016). The mothers interviewed 
in this study invested great importance in their role as a facilitator 
of their child’s cognitive development. Daily interactions with the 
infant were construed as opportunities for accelerating cognitive 
development; and by definition, an opportunity can be exploited 
or lost. The high stakes thereby embedded in the enhancement 
agenda fostered a widespread moralization of everyday caring 
activity. For example, mothers equated brief disengagement from 
their infants with neglect and condemned their self-adjudicated 
failure to live up to the demands of being a “good mother.” Budds 
et al. (2016) suggest that lay interpretations of the enhancement 
agenda function to reinforce the gendered division of labor and 
tighten the bonds linking women’s identity to the domestic sphere.
The motivations behind pediatric neuro-enhancement are 
thus centrally premised on the forms parent–child relationships 
take in contemporary society. Pediatric neuro-enhancement 
finds a market because parents want the best for their child. 
What constitutes “the best” is determined by the culture in which 
the family lives. Nadesan (2002) suggests that the vogue for 
cognitive enhancement is driven by parental consciousness of a 
labor market demand for “entrepreneurial knowledge-workers.” 
As such, neuro-enhancement plays on the understandable paren-
tal desire for their child to be recognized as a valuable member 
of society and receive the attendant social and material rewards. 
Additionally, in a society characterized by growing awareness 
of mental health difficulties, neuro-enhancement discourses 
promise parents a route to ensuring their child’s happiness and 
emotional well-being.
“Doing the best” for one’s child is not an entirely selfless 
enterprise, however. Wall’s (Wall, 2010) interviewees expressed 
an awareness that their own social status among their peers was 
contingent on their child’s achievements. Producing high-achiev-
ing children is a means of enhancing one’s own social capital, and 
perhaps one’s material security in old age. Demonstrating aware-
ness of the latest scientific concepts is also a cultural signifier, 
marking oneself as a knowledgeable, up-to-date, and committed 
parent (Nadesan, 2002). As such, it is difficult to separate the 
extent to which pediatric cognitive enhancement is driven by an 
intrinsic desire to serve the child’s welfare versus the secondary 
benefits that a child’s accomplishments lend their parent.
neUrO-enhanceMenT in aging
Besides enhancing child neurodevelopment, the other dominant 
focus of neuro-enhancement discourse is preventing age-related 
cognitive deterioration (O’Connor and Joffe, 2015). Aging 
populations across the developed world have resulted in dramatic 
increases in dementia prevalence, and great concern about the 
social and economic repercussions this entails. In this context, 
health promotion initiatives and the popular press strongly 
advocate that middle-aged adults should structure their lifestyle 
around a dementia-prevention regime that infiltrates the most 
routine dimensions of daily life, dictating appropriate food 
choices, behavioral practices, and mental activities (O’Connor 
and Joffe, 2015). The prominence afforded to these ideas means 
that among the general lay population, there is now high aware-
ness regarding the supposedly protective effects of crossword 
puzzles, dietary supplements, and social interaction (Friedman 
et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2015; O’Connor and Joffe, 2015).
Similar to pediatric neuro-enhancement, there is limited 
evidence for the efficacy of such methods (Katz and Peters, 2008; 
Palmour and Racine, 2011). However, they retain a grip on the 
public imagination due to the fear that dementia commands in 
contemporary culture. Research shows that aging is often accom-
panied by high levels of dread about future cognitive decline 
(Cutler and Hodgson, 1996; Corner and Bond, 2004; Kim et al., 
2015). A 2014 US poll conducted by the Alzheimer’s Association 
identified Alzheimer’s disease as the public’s most feared illness, 
and the recent increase in dementia prevalence is framed in hyper-
bolic terms of an “epidemic,” “tsunami,” or “time-bomb” (Peel, 
6O’Connor and Nagel Neuro-Enhancement, Relationality, and Individualism
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 2 | Article 1
2014). The anxiety surrounding dementia is absent from many 
non-Western cultures, where cognitive decline and memory loss 
are seen as normal aspects of the aging process (Faure-Delage 
et al., 2012; Perkinson and Solimeo, 2013). In contrast, in highly 
cognitivized Western societies where intellectual performance is 
a key marker of personal worth, dementia signals a sharp rupture 
from one’s previous identity (von Faber et  al., 2001; Williams 
et al., 2011; Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012; Buckley et al., 2015). 
Research on public understandings of dementia commonly 
reveals an idea that with the onset of dementia, the person who 
previously occupied that body “disappears” or becomes “lost” 
(von Faber et al., 2001; Corner and Bond, 2004; McParland et al., 
2012; Buckley et al., 2015). Dementia thus heralds the symbolic 
although not the physical end of life, a phenomenon Sweeting and 
Gilhooly (1997) term “social death.” In this context, any hope of a 
means of preventing this highly feared and still incurable disease 
is eagerly received by the public and heavily covered in the mass 
media (Kirkman, 2006; Kang et al., 2010; O’Connor et al., 2012; 
Van Gorp and Vercruysse, 2012; Peel, 2014).
As with pediatric neuro-enhancement, the drive to prevent 
dementia through lifestyle choices can be characterized as per-
petuating the individualization of health problems. Currently 
healthy individuals are tasked with structuring their daily routine 
around maintaining neurocognitive resilience, with the implica-
tion that the onset of dementia is attributable to the individual’s 
prior self-disciplinary failings (Peel, 2014). Yet, as with neuro-
enhancement in children, relationality is paramount in the lived 
experience of dementia-prevention discourses. Research shows 
that much of the fear aging adults express toward dementia is not 
centered on the repercussions for themselves, but the implica-
tions for their loved ones who will be forced into caring roles 
(Corner and Bond, 2004; Steeman et  al., 2006; Buckley et  al., 
2015). Responsibilities for caring for aging adults traditionally 
fall on their children, although this became more variable in the 
late twentieth century due to increased geographic mobility and 
female workforce participation (Mancini and Blieszner, 1989; 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Nevertheless, it is still women 
who are disproportionately allocated caring responsibilities for 
aging relatives, which they must balance with their existing occu-
pational, domestic, and childcare labor (Brody, 1981; Stephens 
et  al., 2001). In this context, the dread of becoming a physical 
and emotional burden on one’s loved ones accounts for much 
of the anguish that oncoming dementia elicits (Steeman et  al., 
2006; Buckley et al., 2015). Interviews with older people reveal a 
positioning of family members as the “real victims” of dementia, 
and a belief that the demented person’s confusion protects them 
from fully appreciating the indignities of their situation (Corner 
and Bond, 2004).
Given that concerns for other people lie at the heart of the alarm 
dementia elicits, it is likely that the forces that motivate people 
to engage in dementia-prevention regimes pertain to these rela-
tional concerns, rather than pure self-protection. This appeared 
to be the case in interviews conducted by O’Connor and Joffe 
(2014, 2015), which asked laypeople to free-associate around the 
topic of “brain research.” Half of the 48 interviewees introduced 
the topic of dementia, often in the context of the importance 
of preventing its onset through neuro-enhancement regimes. 
Discussion of dementia was permeated with an acute sense of 
anxiety, especially among older participants. In considering the 
reasons for this fear, participants often focused not on the intrin-
sic symptoms of the disorder itself, but on the anticipated loss of 
important relationships. Especially salient was the specific fear of 
losing memory of one’s children, a prospect that was particularly 
likely to prey on female participants’ minds. The other outcome of 
dementia that preoccupied people was loss of independence and 
self-sufficiency. Loss of self-control was seen as compromising 
the integrity and dignity of the person, such that deterioration 
of the brain heralded a disintegration of the whole self. Further, 
damage to the brain was seen as engendering reliance on oth-
ers. For those who anticipated that caregivers would be family 
members, the worry focused on the difficulties their loved ones 
would experience as a result. For those who mentioned reliance 
on paid caregiving, the primary concerns were vulnerability to 
exploitation and becoming a drain on public resources.
Thus, a person’s unique relational circumstances are pivotal in 
how they envision life with dementia to unfold, and thus in their 
motivations to engage with aging-related neuro-enhancement 
discourses. Adopting neuro-enhancement practices may be 
driven by the desire to prevent deprivations that would befall 
one’s loved ones rather than oneself.
FrOM PersOnal TO relaTiOnal 
resPOnsiBiliTY: cOnsiDering 
relaTiOnaliTY as KeY TO 
UnDersTanDing neUrO-enhanceMenT
The evidence reviewed above suggests that to understand 
the ideological dynamics of current manifestations of neuro-
enhancement, we need a conceptualization of how responsibility 
can be experienced as a relational rather than individual phenom-
enon. The philosophical literature on responsibility provides some 
insights in this regard but is surprisingly silent on the relational 
nature of the everyday experience of responsibility. The notion of 
responsibility is deeply rooted in Western beliefs about autonomy 
and morality. Traditionally, responsibility can be understood as 
either causal or moral responsibility. While causal responsibil-
ity only describes the causal relationship between an entity and 
an event, and therefore does not involve agency (e.g., bacteria’s 
responsibility for a disease), moral responsibility results from an 
actor’s decision to perform a morally significant action, which is 
characterized by blame- or praiseworthiness (Eshleman, 2016). 
In the philosophical literature on moral responsibility, there is 
a long-standing debate regarding whether moral responsibility 
can be ascribed to groups (collective responsibility) as well as 
to individuals (individual or personal responsibility) (May and 
Hoffman, 1991; Sadler, 2006; Björnsson, 2011). These debates 
focus on the possibility of groups perpetuating morally significant 
actions, and therefore praise or blame for the collective agent. 
However, there have been challenges to the notion of associating 
moral blameworthiness with groups, since moral agency is often 
understood as an individual property (Sverdlik, 1987).
Recently, a few rare approaches to responsibility have arisen 
that distance themselves from an individualistic approach. 
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Gergen (2009, 2011) argues for a relational responsibility that 
makes individuals care for relationships in order to sustain 
morality. In what he describes as “second-order morality,” 
humans need to take responsibility for relationships by devot-
ing “attention and effort to means of sustaining the potential 
for co-creating meaning” (Gergen, 2011, p. 218). Relational 
responsibility is needed, in which not only the individuals 
but also the relations are subject to responsibility. In being 
responsible for relationships, both narcissism and self-negation 
can be avoided (Gergen, 2011). Similarly, Visse et  al. (2012), 
with recourse to Walker’s (Walker, 2007) work on moral 
understanding, demonstrate how responsibility is a relational 
and contextual practice. Accordingly, moral responsibilities 
evolve with interaction; they are relational and collaborative. 
Understanding responsibilities thus requires attention to pre-
vailing narratives of identity, relationships, and value.
Most philosophical literature on responsibility seeks to deter-
mine how responsibility “really is” or how it “should be” allocated. 
Notably, there has been little philosophical discussion of the 
role played by human relationships in subjective experiences of 
responsibility (Walker, 2007; Gergen, 2011; Visse et al., 2012). The 
notion of relational responsibility has received minimal elabora-
tion in the theoretical discourses on responsibility, let alone in 
deliberations regarding the ethical and social questions around 
neuro-enhancement specifically. This silence on the question 
of relationality from philosophers and ethicists working on 
responsibility leaves us under-equipped to conceptualize the 
lay perceptions of responsibility discussed above in relation 
to neuro-enhancement in early and late life. As demonstrated, 
in both cases, concerns for other people lie at the heart of the 
endeavors and perceived imperatives.
The discussion of relational responsibility that exists in 
other scholarly literature is mostly rooted in clinical contexts. 
The relational dimension of personal health decisions is vividly 
illustrated in the field of genetic testing, where disclosure of one 
individual’s genetic status necessarily has implications for their 
genetic relatives. Research with people considering undergoing 
genetic testing for hereditary cancers shows that the decision 
is rarely approached by considering the risks and benefits for 
oneself alone (d’Agincourt-Canning, 2006; Arribas-Ayllon et al., 
2008; Kearns et  al., 2010). The processes involved in genetic 
testing are relational at every level: for example, the decision to 
undergo testing may be motivated more by concern about one’s 
children’s risk status than one’s own (d’Agincourt-Canning, 2006); 
some people may feel coerced by relatives to acquire information 
they would rather not have (ibid); and people may feel an obliga-
tion to circulate the results of their own test around their wider 
kinship network (d’Agincourt-Canning, 2001). These instances 
of relational responsibilities steering people’s health decisions 
may reflect similar processes in everyday engagement with 
neuro-enhancement. However, the relational responsibilities that 
affect neuro-enhancement may also diverge from those evident 
in medical contexts, since neuro-enhancement is often initiated 
by a person him/herself without any professional advice or sup-
port, and since it is directed at improving baseline functioning 
rather than addressing an active dysfunction. Further research 
is required to establish the extent to which empirical accounts of 
relational responsibility in clinical contexts mirror its specific role 
in neuro-enhancement activities.
Other work on decision-making processes has elaborated 
the concept of “relational autonomy.” The common view of 
autonomy expression in health care decision-making can be 
described as “sterile” autonomy. The clinician bears responsibil-
ity to convey the benefits, harms, options, and consequences 
of treatment options for a presenting problem, from which the 
patient (or a surrogate speaking for the patient) is expected to 
choose. In the recent past, feminist and communitarian scholars 
have developed variants on the alternative concept of “relational 
autonomy” (Nedelsky, 1989; Friedman, 2000; Christman, 2004; 
Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2010). Relational accounts of autonomy 
recognize that when people make decisions, they usually admit 
input from friends, family, colleagues, or professionals (Nagel 
and Reiner, 2013). They often do so intentionally, without 
feeling unduly influenced. Nagel (2015) describes it thus: 
“Individuals in health care settings who feel overwhelmed or 
do not perceive themselves as sufficiently qualified might ask 
for support in a decision process […] professionals could offer 
support if they perceive that the patient could benefit from it” 
(p. 50). Such accounts, which consider the interdependencies 
characterizing our lives, were recently further substantiated by 
Specker-Sullivan (2016), who suggested “maternalism” as an 
alternative ethical framework. “Maternalism” avoids the main 
objections against paternalism while acknowledging that an 
individual’s choices often are influenced by others. Those influ-
ences mirror the interdependencies, and the various practices 
premised on these social dynamics are in the individual’s best 
interest if they follow the individual’s values.
The above philosophical and medical discussions are prem-
ised  on the principle that symbiotic and interdependent rela-
tionships are paramount in lived human experience. It is clear 
that human beings are not atomized, alienated individuals: we 
are socially embedded in constant interaction with others, both 
directly and indirectly. This is particularly evident in the early 
and late phases in life. In childhood, parent–child relationships 
are essential for survival, and their significance reemerges in later 
life as parents’ increasing needs render them dependent on their 
offspring. Discussing neuro-enhancement in childhood and old 
age without consideration of the manifold interdependencies that 
steer motivations thus risks ignoring a key driving force underlying 
acceptance or rejection of opportunities for neuro-enhancement. 
Recognizing the impact of social relations for the values and 
motivations underlying the pursuit of neuro-enhancement fills a 
gap in our understanding of how neuro-enhancement practices 
manifest in everyday thought and action. A more holistic under-
standing of the relational dynamics that characterize everyday 
engagement with neuro-enhancement technologies will enable 
better anticipation of the risks and benefits such technologies 
may entail, due to greater insight into how they are likely to be 
enacted in context.
cOnclUDing cOMMenTs
Previous discussion of the ideological implications of neuro-
enhancement has afforded minimal attention to its relational 
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dimensions. This may be due to a tendency to premise 
analysis on a false dichotomy between individualistic and 
socio-structural conceptual frameworks, which assumes that 
focusing attention on  individual brains necessarily implies 
neglect of socio- structural factors and vice versa. As a result of 
this rhetorical dynamic, the relational dimension, which stands 
as an intermediary between the individual and socio-structural 
levels of explanation, is left unexplored. The above accounts 
of neuro-enhancement in relation to childhood and aging 
highlight the importance of human relationships in mediat-
ing how neuro-enhancement ideas and practices manifest in 
real-world experience.
The empirical evidence indicating the significance of rela-
tionality warrants a caution against simplistic framings of neuro-
enhancement as individualistic in essence. The motives that 
neuro-enhancement harnesses are not just based on individual 
self-interest but also individuals’ investment in the welfare of those 
around them. The relationality evident in lay engagement with 
neuro-enhancement can also be found in political appropriations 
of neuroscience, as a recent analysis of British social policy shows 
(Broer and Pickersgill, 2015). Broer and Pickersgill (2015) observe 
responsibility as a key topic in neuroscientifically informed 
policy reports: it can be found implicitly in the three themes 
their analysis identifies, i.e., optimization, self-governance, and 
vulnerability. Citizens’ responsibilities for solving social problems 
are framed in terms of relationships—parents are responsible for 
optimizing their children’s opportunities, people are responsible 
for governing themselves so others will not have to, and people 
are responsible for defending against the exploitation of their own 
or other’s vulnerability. Broer and Pickersgill’s analysis concludes 
that “reports discussing policy across the life course ascribe spe-
cific social problems to the functioning of brains, yet the solution 
that they plea for is often a relational one, where parents have a 
more loving relationship with their children and understand their 
teenagers better, and where people care for and understand the 
behavior of those with dementia” (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015, 
p. 60). Neuro-enhancement does not deny individuals’ con-
nectedness to others; on the contrary it specifically targets these 
relationships as the medium through which neuro-enhancement 
is to be achieved.
It is important to note that acknowledging the importance of 
relationality does not negate arguments that neuro-enhancement 
can function as a vehicle for neoliberal political and cultural 
agendas. The “social” that is imbricated in neuro-enhancement 
is a very narrow form of relationality, based on immediate 
interpersonal relationships rather than collective bonds (Gillies 
et  al., 2016). In close familial relationships, the psychological 
separation between “self ” and “other” is somewhat blurred. For 
instance, if children are experienced as an extension of the parent, 
serving their benefit simultaneously serves the parent’s own. In 
this sense then, acknowledging relationality does not disconfirm 
arguments that neuro-enhancement exacerbates a cultural ethic 
of self-interest and competitiveness. Moreover, policy interven-
tions that address social relations, but in these very restricted, 
narrow forms, can contribute to obscuring the wider macro-
structural factors which shape people’s lives. There is a strong 
trend of conservative policymakers using neuroscientifically 
informed intervention in the socio-emotional lives of “problem 
families” to discharge their responsibilities to support struggling 
communities in more material ways (Macvarish et  al., 2014; 
Munro and Musholt, 2014). This notwithstanding, academic 
analysis that focuses on families’ interpersonal relations need 
not emulate politicians in therefore forgoing consideration of 
broader social dynamics such as class, gender, and race. Indeed, 
it is only through daily micro-social relations that the influence 
of such variables is realized. For instance, exploring the lived 
experience of neuro-enhancement in childhood and aging 
reveals the particular burden placed on women, who take a 
disproportionate share of responsibility in caring for both their 
children and aging parents.
The above reflections hinge on the premise, well articulated 
by Forlini and Hall (2016) and Pickersgill (2013), that normative 
ethical analysis should be closely tied to empirical evidence that 
enlightens how neuro-enhancement plays out in real-world con-
texts. A valid ethical analysis of neuro-enhancement must start 
from a conscientious inspection of how these practices manifest 
in everyday thought and action. In other words, the priority 
is on “empirical neuroethics” over “anticipatory neuroethics” 
(Illes, 2007; Northoff, 2009; Pickersgill, 2013; Fitz et  al., 2014). 
While there is certainly value in preemptive reflection on as-yet-
unrealized repercussions of neuroscientific advances, numerous 
observers have noted that this form of promissory discourse can 
lean toward collaborating in the “hype” that neuroscience often 
engenders (Vidal, 2009; Conrad and De Vries, 2011; Pickersgill, 
2013). Since neuroscience’s profile began to dramatically rise in 
the late twenty-first century, there have been numerous cases 
where assertions that neuroscience was inciting transforma-
tive societal changes were disconfirmed by empirical evidence 
(O’Connor and Joffe, 2013b). Extreme versions of the individual-
ist interpretation of neuro-enhancement may be one more such 
example. The empirical research that has thus far accumulated 
suggests that far from revolutionizing society, neuroscientific 
knowledge often perpetuates familiar cultural themes (Hagner 
and Borck, 2001; Choudhury et  al., 2009; Vidal, 2009; Ortega, 
2011; O’Connor and Joffe, 2013b). The current paper has argued 
that neuro-enhancement is premised upon and enacted through 
existing human relationships, most notably familial bonds. It can 
therefore reinforce prevailing interpersonal dynamics, whether 
these are positive or negative in nature. For instance, parental 
interest in their children’s welfare is unarguably a personal 
and social good. Yet, when cultural trends funnel this natural 
instinct into practices that place intense and unnecessary pres-
sure on both parent and child, the interests of neither are served. 
Similarly, intergenerational caring relationships can promote 
domestic harmony. Yet, many feminist scholars have highlighted 
the harms of the caring responsibilities delegated to women, who 
are socialized to subordinate their own needs to those of their kin 
(Gilligan, 1982; Bartky, 1990; Kittay, 1999; Held, 2006). Neuro-
enhancement practices reflect and reinforce these relational 
dynamics.
The scope of the current paper excludes several potentially 
fruitful targets of future consideration. First, the extent to which 
the above considerations are specific to neuro-enhancement or 
similarly relevant to other forms of bodily enhancement requires 
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further study of the motivations and practices that characterize 
both domains. Second, by foregrounding the two life phases of 
childhood and old age to demonstrate the importance of relation-
ality, our analysis should not suggest that the period “in-between” 
does not need special attention. To the contrary, it is especially 
people in this phase of life—being parents of young children and/
or children of aging parents—who are delegated the responsibility 
of overseeing others’ neuro-enhancement. Additionally, exhorta-
tions to guard against neurocognitive degeneration target people 
in mid-adulthood as well as those who have already reached 
senior citizenship (Broer and Pickersgill, 2015; O’Connor and 
Joffe, 2015). Discussing the specifics of this “middle” generation, 
which is not even identified by a specific name, is an important 
task for future research. Finally, another important dimension 
that this paper leaves untouched is non-familial relationships 
such as peer and professional interactions. These may be par-
ticularly crucial in uses of neuro-enhancement in educational, 
medical, and occupational settings. We encourage the initiation 
of further research that expands our understanding of how neuro-
enhancement interacts with the manifold forms of relationships 
that characterize the lives of today’s citizenry. Contextualizing 
neuro-enhancement in light of these relational dynamics is criti-
cal for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the promises 
and perils that new neuro-enhancement technologies are likely 
to entail.
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